Freud Resources > 1933a
Freud, Sigmund 1933a , New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trs. James Strachey from Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse: SE 22, GW 15.
Das Symptom stammt vom Verdrängten ab, ist gleichsam der Vertreter desselben vor dem Ich, das Verdrängte ist aber für das Ich Ausland, inneres Ausland, so wie die Realität—gestatten Sie den ungewohnten Ausdruck—äusseres Ausland ist. 1933a, GW 15: 62.
Symptoms are derived from the repressed, they are, as it were, its representatives before the ego; but the repressed is foreign territory to the ego—internal foreign territory—just as reality (if you will forgive the unusual expression) is external foreign territory. 57 P 88
From the very first we have said that human beings fall ill of a conflict between the claims of instinctual life and the resistance which arises within them against it … 57
On the other hand, we are familiar with the notion that pathology, by making things larger and coarser, can draw our attention to normal conditions which would otherwise have escaped us. Where it points to a  breach or a rent, there may normally be an articulation present. If we throw a crystal to the floor, it breaks; but not into haphazard pieces. It comes apart along its lines of cleavage into fragments whose boundaries, though they were invisible, were predetermined by the crystal's structure. Mental patients are split and broken structures of this same kind. Even we cannot withhold from them something of the reverential awe which peoples of the past felt for the insane. They have turned away from external reality, but for that very reason they know more about internal, psychical reality and can reveal a number of things to us that would otherwise be inaccessible to us. P 90
… paranoia …
How would it be if these insane people were right, if in each of us there is present in his ego an agency like this which observes and threatens to punish, and which in them has merely become sharply divided from the ego and mistakenly displaced into external reality? 58-9 P 90
But it is more prudent to keep the agency as something independent and to suppose that conscience is one of its functions and that self-observation, which is an essential preliminary to the judging activity of conscience, is another of them. And since when we recognize that something has a separate existence we give it a name of tis own, from this time forward I will describe this agency in the ego as the "super ego". 60 P 91
melancholia [depression] …
… [the melancholic's] super-ego becomes over-severe, abuses the poor ego, humiliates it and ill-treats it, threatens it with the direst punishments, reproaches it for actions in the remotest past which had been taken lightly at the time … The super-ego applies the strictest moral standard to the helpless ego which is at its mercy; in general it represents the claims of morality, and we realize all at once that our moral sense of guilt is the expression of the tension between the ego and the super-ego. 61 P 92
The part which is later taken on by the super-ego is played to begin with by an external power, by parental authority. Parental influence governs the child by offering proofs of love and by threatening punishments which are signs to the child of loss of love and are bound to be feared on their own account. This realistic anxiety is the precursor of the later moral anxiety. 62 P 93
… the external restraint is internalized and the super-ego takes the place of the parental agency and observes, directs and threatens the ego in exactly the same way as earlier the parents did with the child. 62 P 93-4
… identification … has been not unsuitably compared with the oral, cannibalistic incorporation of the other person. 63 P 94
… the installation of the super-ego can be described as a successful instance of identification with the parental agency. 63-4 P 94
… the super-ego appears as the heir of that emotional attachment which is of such importance for childhood. 64 P 94
Nor must it be forgotten that a child has a different estimate of its parents at different periods of its life. At the time at which the Œdipus complex gives place to the super-ego they are something quite magnificent; but later they lose much of this. Identifications then come about with these later parents as well, and indeed they regularly make important contributions to the formation of character; but in that case they only affect the ego, they no longer influence the super-ego, which has been determined by the earliest parental imagos. 64
… the hypothesis of the super-ego really describes a structural relation and is not merely a personification of some such abstraction as that of conscience. 64 P 96
… this super-ego. It is also the  vehicle of the ego ideal by which the ego measures itself, which it emulates, and whose demand for ever greater perfection it strives to fulfil. There is no doubt that this ego ideal is the precipitate of the old picture of the parents, the expression of admiration for the perfection which the child then attributed to them. 64-5 P 96
… "inferiority complex" … 65 P 97
Es ist damit wie mit unserem Leben; es ist nicht viel wert, aber es ist alles, was wir haben. Ohne die Leuchte der Bewusstseinsqualität wären wir im Dunkel der Tiefenpsychologie verloren; aber wir dürfen versuchen, uns neu zu orientieren.
Was man bewusst heissen soll, brauchen wir nicht zu erörtern,  es ist jedem Zweifel entzogen. 76-7
As may be said of our life, it is not worth much, but it is all we have. Without the illumination thrown by the quality of consciousness, we should be lost in the obscurity of depth-psychology; but we must attempt to find our bearings afresh.
There is no need to discuss what is to be called conscious: it is removed from all doubt. 70 P 102
The discovery, actually an inconvenient one, that portions of the ego and super-ego as well are unconscious in the dynamic sense, operates at this point as relief—it makes possible  the removal of a complication. We perceive that we have no right to name the mental region that is foreign to the ego "the system Ucs.", since the characteristic of being unconscious is not restricted to it. 71-2 P 104
In Anlehnung an den Sprachgebrauch bei Nietzsche und infolge einer Anregung von G. Groddeck heissen wir es fortan das Es. 79
Following a verbal usage of Nietzsche's and taking up a suggestion by Georg Groddeck , we will in future call it the "id". 72 P 104
[Bettelheim:] I will let a few examples speak for many. In the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, in the chapter entitled 'The analysis of the psychical personality,' Freud, speaking of the I, the it, and the above-I, describes them as "the three provinces of the apparatus of the soul" ("die drei Provinzen des seelischen Apparats"). In the Standard Edition the phrase is translated as "the three provinces of the mental apparatus." 72
Lassen Sie mich eine Vergleichung bringen; Vergleiche entscheiden nichts, das ist wahr, aber sie können machen, dass man sich heimischer fühlt. 79
Let me give you an analogy; analogies, it is true, decide nothing, but they can make one feel more at home. 72 P 105
If the partitioning could be neat and clear-cut like this, a Woodrow Wilson would be delighted by it; it would also be convenient for a lecture in a geography lesson. The probability is, however, that you will find less orderliness and more missing, if you travel through the region. 73
A few things are naturally as you expected, for fish cannot be caught in the mountains and wine does not grow in the water. Indeed, the picture of the region that you brought with you may on the whole fit the facts; but you will have to put up with deviations in the details. 73
Sie erwarten nicht, dass ich Ihnen vom Es ausser dem neuen Namen viel Neues mitzuteilen habe. Es ist der dunkle, unzugängliche Teil unserer Persönlichkeit; das wenige, was wir von ihm wissen, haben wir durch das Studium der Traumarbeit and der neurotischen Symptombildung erfahren and das meiste davon hat negativen Charakter, lässt sich nur als Gegensatz zum Ich beschreiben. Wir nähern uns dem Es mit Vergleichen, nennen es ein Chaos, einen Kessel voll brodelnder Erregungen. Wir stellen uns vor, es sei am Ende gegen das Somatische offen, nehme da die Triebbedürfnisse in sich auf, die in ihm ihren psychischen Ausdruck finden, wir können aber nicht sagen, in welchem Substrat. Von den Trieben her erfüllt es sich mit Energie, aber es hat keine Organisation, bringt keinen Gesamtwillen auf, nur das Bestreben, den Triebbedürfnissen unter Einhaltung des Lustprinzips Befriedigung zu schaffen. Für die Vorgänge im Es gelten die logischen Denkgesetze nicht, vor allem nicht der Satz des Widerspruchs. Gegensätzliche Regungen bestehen nebeneinander, ohne einander aufzuheben oder sich voneinander abzuziehen, höchstens dass sie unter dem herrschenden ökonomischen Zwang zur Abfuhr der Energie zu Kompromissbildungen zusammentreten. Es gibt im Es nichts, was man der Negation gleichstellen könnte, auch nimmt man mit Überraschung die Ausnahme von dem Satz der Philosophen wahr, dass Raum und Zeit notwendige Formen unserer seelischen Akten seien. Im Es findet sich nichts, was der Zeitvorstellung entspricht, keine Anerkennung eines zeitlichen Ablaufs und, was höchst merkwürdig ist und seiner Würdigung im philosophischen Denken wartet, keine Veränderung des seelischen Vorgangs durch den Zeitablauf. Wunschregungen, die das Es nie überschritten haben, aber auch Eindrücke, die durch Verdrängung ins Es versenkt worden sind, sind virtuell unsterblich, verhalten sich nach Dezennien, als ob sie neu vorgefallen wären. Als Vergangenheit erkannt, entwertet  und ihrer Energiebesetzung beraubt können sie erst werden, wenn sie durch die analytische Arbeit bewusst geworden sind, und darauf beruht nicht zum kleinsten Teil die therapeutische Wirkung der analytischen Behandlung.
Ich habe immer wieder den Eindruck, dass wir aus dieser über jedem Zweifel feststehenden Tatsache der Unveränderlichkeit des Verdrängten durch die Zeit viel zu wenig für unsere Theorie gemacht haben. Da scheint sich doch ein Zugang zu den tiefsten Einsichten zu eröffnen. Leider bin auch ich da nicht weiter gekommen.
Selbstverständlich kennt das Es keine Wertungen, kein Gut and Böse, keine Moral. Das ökonomische oder, wenn Sie wollen, quantitative Moment, mit dem Lustprinzip innig verknüpt, beherrscht alle Vorgänge. Triebbesetzungen, die nach Abfuhr verlangen, das, meinen wir, sei alles im Es. 79-81
You will not expect me to have much to tell you that is new about the id apart from its new name. It is the dark, inaccessible part of our personality; what little we know of it we have learnt from our study of the dream-work and of the construction of neurotic symptoms, and most of that is of a negative character and can be described only as a contrast to the ego. We approach the id with analogies: we call it a chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitations. We picture it as being open at its end to somatic influences, and as there taking up into itself instinctual needs which find their psychical expression in it, but we cannot say in what substratum. It is filled with energy from the instincts, but it has no organization, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle. The logical laws of thought do not apply in the id, and this is true above all of the law of contradiction. Contrary impulses exist side by side, without cancelling each other out or diminishing each other: at the most they may converge to form compromises under the dominant economic pressure towards  the discharge of energy. There is nothing in the id that could be compared with negation; and we perceive with surprise an exception to the philosophical theorem that space and time are necessary forms of our mental acts. There is nothing in the id that corresponds to the idea of time; there is no recognition of the passage of time, and—a thing that is most remarkable and awaits consideration in philosophical thought—no alteration in its mental processes is produced by the passage of time. Wishful impulses which have never passed beyond the id, but impressions, too, which have been sunk into the id by repression, are virtually immortal; after the passage of decades they behave as though they had just occurred. They can only be recognized as belonging to the past, can only lose their importance and be deprived of their cathexis of energy, when they have been made conscious by the work of analysis, and it is on this that the therapeutic effect of analytic treatment rests to no small extent. 73-4 P 105-6
Again and again I have had the impression that we have made too little theoretical use of this fact, established beyond any doubt, of the unalterability by time of the repressed. This seems to offer an approach to the most profound discoveries. Nor, unfortunately, have I myself made any progress here. 74 P 106-7
The id of course knows no judgements of value: no good and evil, no morality. The economic or if you prefer, the quantitative factor, which is intimately linked to the pleasure principle, dominates all its processes. Instinctual cathexes seeking discharge—that, in our view, is all there is in the id. … 74
You can see, incidentally, that we are in a position to attribute to the id characteristics other than that of its being unconscious, and you can recognize the possibility of portions of the ego and super-ego being unconscious without possessing the same primitive and irrational characteristics. 75 P 107
We can best arrive at the characteristics of the actual ego, in so far as it can be distinguished from the id and from the super-ego, by examining its relation to the outermost superficial portion of the mental apparatus, which we describe as the system Pcpt.-Cs. [Perceptual-conscious]
We need scarcely look for a justification of the view that the ego is that portion of the id which was modified by the proximity and influence of the external world, which is adapted for the reception of stimuli and as a protective shield against stimuli, comparable to the cortical layer by which a small piece of living substance is surrounded. The relation to the external world has become the decisive factor for the ego; it has taken on the task of representing the external world to the id—fortunately for the id, which could not escape destruction if, in its blind efforts for the satisfaction of its instincts, it disregarded that supreme external power. In accomplishing this function, the ego must observe the external world, must lay down an accurate picture of it in the memory-traces of its perceptions, and its exercise of the function of "reality-testing" must put aside whatever in this picture of the external world is an addition derived from internal sources of excitation. The ego controls the approaches to motility under  the id's orders; but between a need and an action it has interposed a postponement in the form of the activity of thought, during which it makes use of the mnemic residues of experience. In that way it has dethroned the pleasure principle which dominates the course of events in the id without any restriction and has replaced it by the reality principle, which promises more certainty and greater success. 75-6 P 108
The relation to time, which is so hard to describe, is also introduced into the ego by the perceptual system; it can scarcely be doubted that the mode of operation of that system is what provides the origin of the idea of time. But what distinguishes the ego from the id quite especially is a tendency to synthesis in its contents, to a combination and unification in its mental processes which are totally lacking in the id. 76 P 108
To adopt a popular mode of speaking, we might say that the ego stands for reason and good sense while the id stands for the untamed passions. 76 P 109
The ego is after all only a portion of the id, a portion that has been expediently modified by the proximity of the external world with its threat of danger. 76-7 P 109
The ego's relation to the id might be compared with that of a rider to his horse. 77 P 109
The poor ego … serves three severe masters … P 110
If the ego is obliged to admit its weakness, it breaks out in anxiety—realistic anxiety regarding the external world, moral anxiety regarding the super-ego and neurotic anxiety regarding the strength of the passions in the id. 78 P 111
diagram 78 P 111 GW: 85
[GMG: Note that the diagram in the English translation is, believe it or not, sideways in relation to its representation in the Gesammelte Werke edition. The German version strikingly suggests an eye, with the perceptual-conscious system to the front and looking like the cornea. The Ich (I or ego) is in the middle of the 'eye'. The 'repressed' division is at the bottom, leaning to the back of the 'eye' (to the left), next to which is the indication 'unconscious'. The Es (It or id) is at the very back of the 'eye', in front of an opening suggesting the opening of the optic nerve leading to the brain and the darkness within. The Über-Ich (Over-I or super-ego) is at the top of the 'eye'.
The English version suggests nothing so much as a boiled egg with the top cut off and replaced. The principal parts of the 'mental personality', the id, ego and super-ego are all lying on their sides. Only the words indicating the systems: perceptual-conscious, preconscious and unconscious, are upright.
The only advantage of the English representation is that the id and the unconscious are at the bottom of the diagram. The German has the brilliant advantage that the whole suggests perception, and location in the human head. In addition the 'I' is in the 'eye' and the 'Over-I' is in fact over the 'I'.]
Sie sehen hier, das Über-Ich taucht in das Es ein; als Erbe des Ödipuskomplexes hat es ja intime Zusammenhänge mit ihm; es liegt weiter ab vom Wahrnehmungssystem als das Ich. Das Es verkehrt mit der Aussenwelt nur über das Ich, wenigstens in diesem Schema. 1933a, GW 15: 85.
As you see here, the super-ego merges into the id; indeed, as heir to the Œdipus complex it has intimate relations with the id; it is more remote than the ego from the perceptual system. The id has intercourse with the external world only through the ego—at least, according to this diagram. 79 P 111
In thinking of this division of the personality into an ego, a super-ego and an id, you will not, of course, have pictured sharp frontiers like the artificial ones drawn in political geography … but rather by areas of colour melting into one another … After making the separation we must allow what we have separated to merge together once more. … It is highly probably that the development of these divisions is subject to real variations in different individuals; it is possible that in the course of actual functioning they may change and go through a temporary phase of involution. Particularly in the case of what is phylogenetically the last and most delicate of these divisions—the differentiation between the ego and the super-ego— … 79 P 112
… therapeutic efforts of psychoanalysis … its intention is, indeed, to strengthen the ego, to make it more independent of the super-ego, to widen its field of perception and enlarge its organization, so that it can appropriate fresh portions of the id. Where id was, there ego shall be. It is a work of culture—not unlike the draining of the Zuider Zee. 80 P 112.
[This is the ending of Lecture 31, 'The dissection of the personality'. The editor points out that 'The greater part of the material in this lecture is derived—with some amplifications—from Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 5 of The Ego and the Id, 1923b.' P 88]
[Bettelheim:] Late in his life, Freud updated his thoughts on the structure of the human psyche in the thirty-first of the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. At its conclusion, he summed up the purpose of psychoanalysis as theory and as therapy with the statement "Where it was, there should become I." By this he did not mean that the I should eliminate the it or take over the it's place in our psyche, since according to his theoretical constructs the it  is the source of our vital energy, without which life itself could not continue. … Freud's statement in the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis was meant to indicate that in some instances, with respect to certain aspects of life that have been previously dominated entirely or largely by the it, the I ought to exercise its constructive influence and successfully control the undesirable outcroppings of the it.
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